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Abstract 
This study provides an analysis of the aid-private capital flows-growth nexus for Ghana. 
It is premised on the argument that Ghana’s new status as a middle income country plus 
the start of oil production is bound to result in a reduction in ODA inflows in the long 
term. However in the short to medium term ODA will remain an important component 
in the country’s fiscals as well as an important tool for leveraging government policy. 
One of the key questions that the study addresses is how aid can be used as to reinforce 
the country’s growth in a way that reduces its chances of being a victim of the ‘oil 
curse’. The study makes two key observations about the economy of Ghana. First, it 
notes that although the structure of the economy has changed over the years, the 
observed change has not been of the developmentally transformative type. Production 
within the economy still takes place on the lower end of the technology scale and the 
country’s exports is still dominated by primary products. Second, it notes that revenue 
from oil can at best replace foreign aid in the long run. However in the short to …  
 
 
Keywords: aid, oil production, structural change 
JEL classification: H60, O11, O13 
  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Janis Vehmaan-Kreula at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 
 
… medium term, Ghana will have the complement of both oil and aid. It there behoves 
on the country that aid is used in an efficient and creative way so as to help improve 
productivity and production in agriculture and manufacturing. The study concludes by 
making two suggestions as to how aid can be used to help transform the economy. The 
first suggestion is to tackle the structural deficiency in the country’s fiscals in a decisive 
way. The second is the need to properly prioritize public investments so as to maximize 
their returns. 
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1 Introduction 
Ghana has made noteworthy progress in promoting development on both the political 
and economic front. Although the economy has grown at a reasonable rate over the last 
decade, continuing at this level will not deliver the ‘Asian Miracle-type’ transformation 
that it seeks, even with the discovery and production of oil. Indeed even the current 
economic growth situation remains precarious. Growth and structural change have been 
mainly driven by public investment (financed from aid) and private investments 
(particularly the efficiency-seeking type) have been slow to respond. The fiscal situation 
in particular, remains worrisome with internal budgetary slippages and continued 
pressure for increases in recurrent spending.  
 
The start of oil production will undoubtedly engender increased foreign direct 
investment (FDI), particularly that which is targeted at prospecting and upstream 
activities. The potential of FDI to contribute to development is well documented. 
However the nature and degree of the benefits is known to differ depending on the type 
of FDI. For instance it is argued that the efficiency-seeking type of FDI which tends to 
have larger developmental impacts as compared to the resource-seeking type, have been 
low to Ghana (Barthel et al. 2011). 
 
External capital (both official and private) constitutes an important source of financing 
development projects in Ghana. The country’s new status as a lower middle income 
country will on the one hand mean that in the medium- to long-term concessional 
lending and grants (official aid) is likely to reduce. On the other hand this new status 
could also increase its credit ratings and consequently give the country more access to 
private capital. However borrowing from the private market is more expensive and 
requires a more efficient use of the funds than is currently the case. Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA) will therefore remain an important source of 
development finance for Ghana in the short- to medium-term. 
 
Unfortunately neither the prospect of the oil revenue nor the increased FDI that is 
anticipated can be considered as panaceas for avoiding ‘Dutch disease’ problems or 
indeed guarantee a move to a path of higher growth and sustained human development. 
The fiscal imbalances and structural weaknesses that persist make any significant 
developmental transformation within the economy a challenge. There is the need to 
increase efficiency in public finances and also strengthen the linkages between the 
emerging oil sector and the rest of the economy. In line with this and in view of the fact 
that current ODA levels can only be maintained in the short- to medium-term, an 
important question that needs to be answered is how ODA can be used to help improve 
efficiency of public spending and help improve linkages with key sectors of the 
economy? A second and related question is whether ODA can be used as leverage in 
attracting more efficiency-seeking type of investments. These questions among others 
form the basis of this study. 
2  Current economic situation in Ghana 
As the first country south of the Sahara to gain political independence in 1957, Ghana 
has often been touted as the beacon of hope for Africa. However, the country’s 
economic development has not always met expectations. The country has made 
important political and economic strides in recent years. It has held two democratic 
elections in the past decade, each followed by a peaceful transition of political power. 2 
Both economic and political management has continued to improve over the last two 
decades placing the country in a very good stead for regional stability in West Africa. 
The economic benefits have been tangible with growth remaining positive over a long 
period and in more recent years (over the last 10 years) increasing. The country is also 
on track to cut the prevalence of extreme poverty in half by 2015 relative to the level 
experienced in 1990. However there remain many challenges on the economic front in 
Ghana today. We discuss the current state of the Ghanaian economy today when the 
country has attained lower middle income status and has just started oil production.  
2.1 Growth 
 
Economic growth in Ghana was often oscillatory and on average negative before the 
mid-1980s. This was a reflection of poor policy choices and missed opportunities, and 
unsurprisingly some authors have labelled this period as the ‘black years’ (see Killick 
2010). However this pattern of growth changed from the mid-1980s when Ghana started 
with the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). Between 1990-
2000 economic growth averaged about 4.5 per cent, further increasing over the next 
decade (2001-10) and averaging about 5.6 per cent annually. There are two key features 
of the trends in economic growth in Ghana. First, we see a marked reduction in the 
volatility in growth over the last twenty years. Second, there seem to be the beginnings 
of an acceleration in Ghana’s growth. Both these features are positive. However, in spite 
of these very positive developments it is also important to note that the threat from a 
negative external shock as well as internal fiscal slippages remains and must not be lost 
on any analysis of the economic situation in the country. Indeed the negative external 
shock (from both the recent financial and recent food crisis) as well as the large fiscal 
deficits of 2008 together account for the decrease in growth that was recorded over the 
last two years of the sample (Figure 1). 
2.2  Sectoral composition of GDP in Ghana 
 
Historically, the agricultural sector has been an important sector of the Ghanaian 
economy in terms of contribution to GDP, export and employment. The changing 
pattern in the contribution to GDP of the different sectors can be clearly discerned. We 
note in particular the increased service sector share in GDP over the years. Indeed the 
service sector became the most important sector since the early 1990s according to the 
most recent data from the Ghana Statistical Service and based on the rebased data. In 
2010 the contribution of the service, agriculture and industry to GDP were respectively 
50 per cent, 28 per cent and 22 per cent (Figure 2). This represents quite a change from 
say the 1980s shares of 32 per cent, 44 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. There are 
two important features of the observed trends that need to be highlighted. First as 
already mentioned, the services sector has become the most important in terms of 
contribution to GDP, having overtaken the agriculture sector. Second, the share of 
industry seems to have decreased over the years in spite of record prices in gold over the 
last few years. Does this new pattern signify structural transformation associated with 
modernization (i.e. increased utilization of modern productive technologies with 
increasing use of financial and human capital)? We discuss this by looking at the 
contributions of the various sectors to the changes that have been observed.  
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Figure 1: Real GDP growth rates of Ghana, 1990-2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data obtained from Ghana Statistical Service (2011). 
 
Figure 2: Sectoral contributions to GDP: 1990-2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data obtained from Ghana Statistical Service (2011). 
  
3.8
5.5
3.9
4.5
3.5
4.0
4.7
5.45.14.8
4.24.54.8
5.25.4
6.2
4.6
6.5
8.4
4.7
6.6
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
%
Real GDP Growth
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Agriculture Industry Services4 
We note from Table 1 that within the services sector the big gains have been in the 
transport storage and communications, wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels, 
and finance insurance, real estate and business services, in that order. These sub-sectors 
have helped with the increased importance of the services sector. For industry although 
its importance has remained largely unchanged we note that construction, electricity and 
water, and mining seemed to have increased. The manufacturing sub-sector saw a 
decline over the period—decreasing from the 1980 share of about 15.3 to about 8.5 per 
cent in 2010. Within the agriculture sector, fishing sub-sector seemed to have reduced 
the most—from 4.1 per cent in 1980 to about 2.3 per cent in 2005 and then to about 2.1 
per cent in 2010. These trends show quite clearly that the relative importance of the 
different sectors in GDP has shifted from agriculture to services. However, whether the 
change in the structure is growth-enhancing depends on the relative productivity of the 
agriculture and services sectors (see McMillan and Rodrik 2011). We explore this issue 
some more in subsequent sections of this study.  
2.3  Poverty in Ghana 
 
We discuss the trends in poverty using the last three waves of the Ghana Living 
Standards Surveys (GLSS III, GLSS IV, and GLSS V). Based on the upper poverty line, 
we note that the proportion of Ghanaian households described as poor was about 51.7 
per cent in 1991/92 and decreased to 39.5 per cent in 1998/99 and further to 28.5 per 
cent in 2005/06 (Figure 3). The actual number of poor has also decreased over this 
period—from about 7,931,000 individuals in 1991/92 to 7,203,000 in 1998/99 and then 
6,178,000 in 2005/06. This reduction in poverty coincided with very positive economic 
growth over the period. However the reduction in poverty also coincided with 
increasing inequality. Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient has increased 
consistently over the period—from around 0.373 in 1992 to 0.394 in 2006 (GSS). This 
suggests that the poorest of the poor have participated much less in the growth and 
poverty reduction over this period. 
 
Generally, the surveys reflect the fact that poverty in Ghana has many dimensions. Poor 
communities are characterized by low income, malnutrition, ill health, illiteracy, and 
insecurity. These different attributes reinforce each other to keep households, and at 
times whole communities, in persistent poverty (GSS 2000). Moreover, as in other sub-
Saharan Africa countries, poverty in Ghana is a rural phenomenon and has an 
‘agricultural face’. Rural poverty incidence remains about 4 times that of urban poverty 
incidence (Table 2). We note that within the rural areas, about 46 per cent of food crop 
farming households are poor. In fact, for all the economic activities (except food crop 
farmers) major strides were recorded over the 1991 to 2005 period in terms of a 
reduction in the incidence of poverty—for all the categories the incidence of poverty at 
least halved between the periods 1991/92 and 2005/06.  
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Table 1: Composition of agriculture, industry and services in Ghana, 1990–2010 (% GDP) 
 
   1980  1993  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
  Agriculture  44.4  32.4  31.7  30.8  30.7  30.7  30.9  31.2  30.5  39.3  30.4  28.6  28.1  28.4 
       Agriculture and livestock  32.4  23.6  22.9  21.6  21.7  21.8  21.8  21.6  21.0  26.0  20.7  19.9  19.8  20.5 
       Cocoa production and marketing  3.5  2.0  2.3  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.4  2.9  3.1  5.1  3.0  2.6  2.5  2.5 
       Forestry and logging  4.4  3.4  3.3  4.2  4.2  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.2  3.8  4.1  3.8  3.4  3.3 
       Fishing  4.1  3.3  3.2  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.5  2.3  4.4  2.5  2.2  2.4  2.1 
    Industry (ex oil)  23.1  21.0  20.8  20.4  20.1  20.1  20.1  19.9  20.1  0.0  20.8  21.1  22.2  21.8 
        Mining and quarrying  2.8  2.9  3.0  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.6  5.4  2.8  2.9  2.7  2.7 
        Oil production  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
        Manufacturing  15.3  11.3  10.8  10.6  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.4  10.3  9.6  10.2  9.7  9.2  8.5 
        Electricity and water  1.0  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.7  3.4  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.8 
        Construction  4.0  5.1  5.2  5.2  5.2  5.2  5.3  5.3  5.5  9.4  5.7  6.7  8.6  8.8 
    Services  32.5  46.6  47.5  48.8  49.1  49.2  49.1  48.9  49.4  32.0  48.8  50.3  49.7  49.8 
        Transport storage and communication  9.3  14.0  14.4  15.0  15.1  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.6  5.5  15.9  16.5  16.1  16.1 
        Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and    
        Hotels 
6.7  9.3  9.7  10.6  10.6  10.7  10.7  10.7  11.1  8.0  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.1 
        Finance, insurance, real estate and business  
        Services 
5.4  7.3  7.3  7.4  7.4  7.4  7.4  7.4  7.5  4.8  7.8  8.1  7.7  7.5 
        Government services  8.1  10.2  10.5  10.2  10.3  10.2  10.0  9.9  9.8  11.6  9.9  10.4  10.7  11.2 
        Community, social and personal services  3.1  5.8  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.6  5.5  5.4  2.0  3.7  3.9  3.9  3.9 
 
Source: Based on data from Ghana Statistical Service (2011). 
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Figure 3: Ghana: poverty trends, 1991-2006 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Ghana Living Standard Surveys III, IV and V. 
 
 
Table 2: Incidence of rural poverty, by economic activity (1991–2006) 
Period 1991/92  1998/99  2005/06 
Rural poverty incidence  63.6  49.5  39.2 
Urban poverty incidence  27.7  19.4  10.8 
  Rural poverty incidence 
Public sector  39.1  25.2  13.9 
Private formal  26.2  15.8  14.5 
Private informal  35.4  28.9  14.1 
Export farmers  53.3  30.1  16.3 
Food crop farmers  58.3  50.1  45.5 
Non-farm self-employed.  42.2  33.3  25.3 
Not working  23.9  30.4  19.3 
 
Note: The head-count poverty measure is what is used here. This is essentially based on the 
adult equivalent total consumption expenditure for the household. 
Source: Based on data from Ghana Living Standards Survey, waves III, IV and V. 
2.4 Employment 
 
We analyse the trends in employment over the three waves of the Living Standards 
Survey for Ghana. Definition of the economically active is based on the standard labour 
force framework categorization. At any given time, an economically active person may 
either be employed or unemployed. The currently active population consists of all those 
above a certain specific age who did any work (one hour or more) in the last seven days, 
together with all those who were unemployed during the last seven days but who were 
available to work (GSS 2007). 
 
Figure 4 shows economic activity rates in Ghana between 1991/92 and 2005/06. The 
data suggests that out of a total adult population of about 8 million in 1991/92, about 6 
million people were economically active, translating into an economically active rate of   7
about 76 per cent. The economically active rates, also called labour force participation 
rates, increased to 79.9 per cent in 1999 but declined to 68.7 per cent in 2005/6. The 
decrease in the economic activity rate over the 1998-2006 period is indeed worrying. A 
likely hypothesis is that an increasing number of adults are going to school. This is a 
testable hypothesis but does not form the focus of this study. 
 
A breakdown of the employed by economic activity reveals some interesting findings. 
We note that the agricultural sector remains the most important sector in terms of 
employment. Even though agriculture share of employment declined from 62.2 per cent 
of the total labour force in 1991/92 to 55.8 per cent in 2005/06, the sector still employs 
more than halve of the labour force (Table 4). Historically, trading and manufacturing, 
in that order, are the next significant sources of employment after agriculture in Ghana. 
The trends show that the increasing numbers of economically active population are 
being absorbed relatively less by the agriculture sector. We note for instance that the 
annual growth in employment in the agriculture sector over the period 1991-2006 has 
been lower than the growth in the potential labour force. Indeed over the period the 
annual growth in employment was recorded for utilities (8.3 per cent), construction (6.1 
per cent), and mining and quarrying (5.5 per cent) in that order. 
 
Figure 4: Trend of economic activity rate between 1991 and 2006 (%) 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Ghana Living Standard Surveys III, IV and V. 
 
The unemployed are defined as the economically active population in the 15 to 64 years 
cohort who were not working in the seven days prior to the survey but were available 
for work. In Table 3 we show the national unemployment rate based on this definition. 
We note that the unemployment rate increased from about 4.7 per cent in 1991/92 to 
about 8.2 per cent in 1998/99, but decreased to 3.6 per cent in 2005/06. The 
unemployment rate remained higher in the urban areas than in the rural areas over the 
period. We also note that the unemployment rate for females was slightly higher than 
that for males, particularly for rural areas.  
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Table 3: Unemployment rates between 1991/92 and 2005/06 for adults aged, (15-64) years, (%) 
Locality       Sex  1991/92  1998/99  2005/06 
                      Urban 
     Male  9.9  13.9  6.5 
     Female  12.5  13  6.2 
     All  11.3  13.4  6.3 
                     Rural 
     Male  1.1  4.3  1.4 
     Female  2.2  6.4  1.7 
     All  1.7  5.5  1.6 
                     National 
     Male  3.7  7.5  3.5 
     Female  5.4  8.7  3.6 
     All  4.7  8.2  3.6 
 
Source: Based on data from Ghana Living Standard Survey III, IV and V. 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of the currently employed population aged 15–64 years, by industry group 
  % of Economically active (millions)  Annual 
growth  Main  industry  1991/92  1998/99 2005/6 1991/92  1998/99 2005/6 
Agriculture 62.2  55  55.8  3.74  4.52  5.10  2.2% 
Mining/Quarrying 0.5  0.7  0.7  0.03  0.06  0.06  5.5% 
Manufacturing 8.2  11.7  10.9  0.49  0.96  1.00  5.1% 
Utilities 0.1  0.2  0.2  0.01  0.02  0.02  8.3% 
Construction 1.2  1.4  1.8  0.07  0.11  0.16  6.1% 
Trading  15.8 18.3 15.2 0.95 1.50 1.39 2.7% 
Transportation/communication 2.2  2.2  2.8  0.13  0.18  0.26  4.8% 
Financial  services  0.5  0.8  0.3  0.03 0.07 0.03 -0.7% 
Community/Social services  9.3  9.8  8.6  0.56  0.80  0.79  2.5% 
Other 0  0  3.7  0.00  0.00  0.34 
Total 100  100  100  6.02  8.22  9.14  3.00% 
 
Notes: These employment classifications are only based on the primary (main) occupation of 
adults. 
 
Source: Based on data from Ghana Living Standard Surveys (III, IV and V). 
3  Structural change in the Ghanaian economy 
We have observed that both in terms of contribution to GDP, and also in terms of the 
importance of the different sectors in providing employment, there are some varying 
degrees of changes. Some of the key features that we have observed are as follows: 
•  Share of agriculture and industry in GDP have declined whilst services has 
increased. 
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•  The importance of agriculture in employment has decreased but remains high. 
 
•  The incidence of poverty has only reduced marginally for food crop farmers and 
remains highest among the different economic activity categories. However 
export farmers experienced the biggest drop in the incidence of poverty in the 
1991-2006 period. 
They are two important questions that we wish to address based on this evidence. First, 
is whether these changes reflect ‘structural change’ in the economy. Second, are the 
observed changes consistent with a developmental transformation within the economy?  
 
Although agriculture has lost its number one spot in terms of its contribution to GDP, it 
still remains very important for employment generation as well as generating export 
earnings for the country. The assertion by earlier writers (see Powell and Round 2000) 
that agriculture is critical in terms of sustainable growth and development in the 
Ghanaian economy is still true today. Cocoa remains the main agricultural export of 
Ghana. Its contribution to the total export was about 24.4 per cent in 2009. This is a 
decrease from say the 2005 share of about 32.4 per cent (ISSER 2010). This indicates 
that agriculture’s contribution to exports has declined. However this decline is in no 
way a reflection of a change in production technologies or increasing value addition to 
some of these products. Rather it reflects mainly increasing production and export of 
minerals, timber, and to a very low degree some non-traditional exports such as 
pineapples, peppers and yams (ISSER 2010). Therefore our answer to the questions 
posed above is that, yes the changes reflect a changing structure of the economy but 
these changes are not of the developmentally transformative kind. We have seen some 
changes in the share of cocoa in total exports but generally. However exports remains 
dominated by primary commodities. The contribution of high value manufacturing 
products to exports still remains insignificant.   
 
The NDPC’s (2008), assertion that the absence of structural change compromises 
sustainable growth and development supports this view and reflects the need to move 
away from primary production to secondary and tertiary production. McMillan and 
Rodrik (2011: 1) argue that countries that manage to pull out of poverty and get richer 
are those that are able to diversify away from agriculture and other traditional products. 
They find evidence that for Latin America and Africa labour have moved from high to 
low productivity sectors. They therefore conclude that structural change since the 1990s 
have been growth-reducing.  
 
We note in Table 5 that the agricultural sector in Ghana has been fetching the lowest 
hourly payment. However, apart from the financial services sector, it appears hourly 
earnings of the sectors as a ratio to hourly earnings from the agricultural sector are on 
the decline. Proxying labour productivity by the ratio of hourly earnings of the sectors 
relative to agriculture and following the argument of McMillan and Rodrik (2011) we 
can argue that labour movement from agriculture to the other sectors, except for the 
financial sector (especially between 1998 and 2006) in Ghana, has not conferred much 
economy-wide productivity gains to the country. 
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Table 5: Ratio of average basic hourly earnings of the various sectors to the agricultural sector, 
by the employed aged 15 years and above 
 
Main industry  1991/92  1998/99  2005/06 
Agriculture 1.0  1.0  1.0 
Mining/quarrying 2.0  3.0  2.0 
Manufacturing 2.0  2.4  1.5 
Utilities 1.0  2.2  1.9 
Construction 2.0  2.0  1.5 
Trading 2.0  2.8  1.4 
Transportation/communication 1.0  2.4  1.2 
Financial services  3.0  3.0  3.8 
Community/social services  5.0  2.0  1.4 
Source: Based on data from Ghana Living Standards Surveys (III, IV, V). 
4  Foreign aid to Ghana 
Foreign aid constitutes an important source of development finance in Ghana. As with 
many other aid recipient countries, Ghana gets aid in the form of budgetary and project 
support. In Ghana both the level and proportion of aid (% of GNI) for Ghana has 
increased from the levels in the early 1990s. Net ODA to Ghana increased from under 
US$300 million in 1990 to peak at about US$928 million in 2004 (Figure 5). It 
decreased over the 2005-06 period (when Ghana was undergoing the HIPC) but has 
since increased, and reached about US$820 million in 2009. The Aid to GNI ratio has 
followed a similar trend although it is less pronounced. The aid-GNI ratio increased 
from about 4.6 per cent in 1990 to a peak of about 10.7 per cent in 2004 but fell to about 
5.4 per cent in 2009. 
 
Figure 5: Trends in aid dependency for Ghana, 1990-2009 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on OECD-DAC data from http://www.oecd.org 
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On the sectoral allocations of foreign aid in Ghana, we look at data from MoFEP for 
2010. We note that the energy sector seemed to have attracted the most amount of aid in 
2010 (Figure 6). This result is driven by loans for the construction of the Bui Dam. 
Health and particularly education are down the pecking order in terms of foreign aid to 
Ghana in 2010. However we note that the grants components seem to be very high for 
the health sector—it is second only to the ministry in charge of government machinery. 
This pattern is in a sense positive in that the government seems to be taking relatively 
more loans for sectors that do a lot more infrastructure investment. From a debt 
sustainability point, this is good in so far as there are reasonable medium- to long-term 
returns on these infrastructure investments. It also shows that donors still care about 
social sectors and so are prepared to support the government with grants for these 
sectors. There are however some caveats that one should make with respect to the 
observations on the sector allocation of aid to Ghana. First, under the multi-donor 
budgetary support (MDBS) about a third of external assistance is channelled directly 
through the consolidated funds. Therefore the true extent of the distribution of the 
foreign aid depends in part on the sectoral allocation within the overall government 
budget. Second, the fact that government is taking more loans for infrastructure 
development does not necessarily mean that investments are being prioritized 
appropriately. For instance securing loans to invest in the energy sector is consistent 
with a recent growth diagnostic study which identifies the power sub-sector as a binding 
constraint to private sector investment in Ghana.1 On the other hand many have 
questioned the appropriateness of a recent loan that Ghana is trying to secure from 
South Korea to build houses for public sector workers—the public sector housing 
component of that loan is about US$1.5 billion (about 3 per cent of the GDP for 2010). 
Therefore securing and using loans for infrastructure development is only part of what 
is required in terms of maximizing the effectiveness of aid. The prioritization of these 
aid-financed investment projects is equally important. 
 
The MDBS aid modality was introduced in 2003 by the government of Ghana and its 
main development partners. This was to help increase aid effectiveness, by aligning 
development assistance to government fiscal demands and also enhance the 
predictability of aid to Ghana. To date, the MDBS represents about a third of total 
external assistance flows and MoFEP reports suggests that disbursements under the 
MDBS are more predictable. Although not all the donors were in support of the MDBS 
in the beginning, over time important donors such as Japan and France have come on 
board. Apart from helping to increase effectiveness and predictability of aid, the MDBS 
has also helped in improving discipline in public finances. This is because the resource 
triggers under the MDBS are based on government’s own fiscal and development 
targets agreed with the donor partners, which are in turn based on government’s 
medium-term development plans.  
 
                                                 
1  This is an unpublished study that has been undertaken for the Millennium Challenge Account and the 
USAID as part of the US Partnership for Growth programme with Ghana. It forms the basis for future 
US aid to Ghana.    12
Figure 6: Sectoral breakdown of aid to Ghana (2010) 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on data from Government of Ghana Budget (2011). 
5  Private capital flows to Ghana 
Total private capital flows which consist of FDI and other private capital has increased 
since 2000. From the 2000 level of about US$630 million total private capital peaked at 
about US$2.25 billion in 2007 before reducing marginally to reach the 2009 level of 
about US$2.08 billion (Figure 7). Undoubtedly (FDI) is increasingly becoming an 
important component of total private capital flows, particularly since 2006. Before then 
private inward remittances accounted for the biggest share of private capital flows to 
Ghana. For the non-FDI component of private capital flows, the improvements in the 
political climate plus the growth of the world economy may help explain this increase. 
FDI to Ghana is dominated by the resource-seeking type and so the increases observed 
from about 2006 would have been accounted for largely by the mining sector. Of course 
the favourable political and economic climate has helped in maintaining the momentum 
of the FDI inflows into the country (see Barthel et al. 2011).  
6  Effects of increasing capital flows in Ghana 
Given the volume of aid to Ghana as well as the changing modalities of aid we address 
two issues. The first relates to the growth and development effects of aid to Ghana. The 
second, has to do with the volatility of aid and its effects on growth and development 
(or service delivery). We discuss these issues in this section. 
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Figure 7: Trends in private capital flows (private transfers) to Ghana, 2000-09 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the World Development Indicators (2010). 
6.1  Capital flows and growth in Ghana 
 
In Figure 8 we see that there is a strong and positive correlation between growth and 
capital flows (both private and official). Growth has been particularly strong since 2003 
when Ghana has been attracting record inflows of both private capital investment and 
official transfers. Of course these correlations do not necessarily imply causation, and 
we do not intend to make this claim. However we can say that the higher economic 
growth in Ghana have generally associated with increased capital flows.  
 
We also note that the Human Development Index (HDI) for Ghana shows 
improvements since 2000. In particular the 2009 Human Development Report shows 
that Ghana moved up two places to a rank of 152 in the 2009 HDI and that between 
2000 and 2007 the HDI for Ghana rose from 0.495 to 0.526. Comparatively, Ghana’s 
HDI remains higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average.  
6.2  Capital flows and exchange rate 
 
In Figure 9 we note a negative correlation between the effective exchange rate and 
private official transfers. Generally an increase in transfers (both private and official) 
boosts supply of foreign currency, and therefore leads to an appreciation of the 
currency. These graphs show that aid and other private transfers have helped stabilize 
the real exchange rates in Ghana. Indeed, it may have led to some minimal levels of 
appreciation. The real appreciation has had two effects. First, it has helped mitigate the 
inflationary pressures in the country by keeping domestic price of imports in check. 
This has been quite important in Ghana given the relatively inelastic demand for 
imported final goods. The other possible effect of the exchange rate appreciation is that 
it has hurt the manufacturing sector in Ghana. In other words the exchange rate stability 
(which has been helped by foreign inflows) has been good for macroeconomic stability 
but not so much for growth, particularly of the manufacturing sector.  
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Figure 8: Aid and growth correlations 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the OECD-DAC and World Development Indicators (2010). 
6.3  Capital flows and government fiscal behaviour 
 
Here we only discuss how official flows (aid) have affected government’s fiscal 
behaviour in Ghana. This is because unlike private capital flows, aid is largely given to 
government and this in turn directly affects their fiscal behaviour. Osei et al. (2005) 
using data spanning the period 1966-98 find that aid to Ghana was mainly associated 
with reduced domestic borrowing and increased tax effort. In other words aid did 
influence ‘good economic policy’ in Ghana. This is not surprising as the study period 
coincides with the period of economic and political reform. We explore further how aid 
and government fiscal behaviour have played out over the period of high capital inflows 
and growth. In other words, what is aid doing differently with respect to fiscal 
behaviour in Ghana today? 
 
Figure 9: Capital flows and exchange rate correlations 
 
 
Source: Based on data obtained from the Bank of Ghana and the World Development Indicators 
(2010).   15
6.4  Aid and government expenditure 
 
We note from Figure 10 that over the period 2002-07, whenever aid inflows increased, 
government’s capital expenditure also increased. This however changed in the 2007-09 
period when we observe rather the opposite—aid increased whilst capital expenditure 
declined. This suggests that while capital expenditure was dependent on aid inflows 
between 2002-07, the same cannot be said in the last two years of the sample. We also 
note from a close examination of the trends that recurrent expenditures has a lower 
correlation with aid flows, relative to capital expenditures. This can be explained by the 
fact that as an expenditure item, capital is almost treated as a ‘residual’ in Ghana—
government sees to salaries and other statutory funds before it tackles the capital 
expenditure items. As a result aid shocks over the period were usually absorbed by the 
capital expenditure component.  
7  Is aid predictability a problem for Ghana 
7.1 Aid  predictability 
 
This section assesses the degree of predictability of aid at the aggregate level. We use 
the concept of ‘on-budget’  aid predictability. This captures the relative deviation 
between on-budget aid commitments and disbursement (see Celasun and Walliser 
2008). 
 
We note from Figure 11 that on-budget aid to Ghana has generally been unpredictable 
during 2002-09. However, aid became more reliable from about 2005. The tendency 
was for actual aid disbursement to be lower than the committed level with the 
experiences of a shortfall dominating the windfalls—in only two of the eight years in 
the sample do we observe a windfall in on-budget aid. The degree of unpredictability is 
seen to be higher for loans than it is for grants. On average the actual grants and loans 
received respectively fell short of the committed levels by about US$10.6 million and 
US$21.5 million annually. The better predictability of grants compared to loans may in 
 
Figure 10: Aid and government expenditure (recurrent versus capital) 
 
Source: Based on data from various editions of Government of Ghana Budgets and the 2010 World 
Development Indicators.   16
part be a result of the HIPC inflows. This is a grant component and tends to be relatively 
more predictable in the short-term than other forms of aid. Even though aid has become 
more reliable, it is still important to understand how it is impacting on the fiscal 
situation and how government has responded to it.  
7.2  Government’s response to aid volatility 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the correlation between aid predictability and various types of 
government expenditures. One observes from this plot that the correlation between 
short-term on-budget aid predictability and government expenditures appear weak. This 
suggests that government expenditures have not generally been responsive to aid 
shortfalls. We also note that there seem to be a weak but positive relationship between 
predictability in total payments and aid predictability. However when there have been 
on-budget windfalls, domestic financing have been negative or relatively low as 
observed for 2003–05 (Figure 12). It needs to be recognized that this period coincides 
with the period when Ghana joined the HIPC initiative and when its reached completion 
point. Since 2006 the country has consistently recorded a shortfall in on-budget aid and 
this has been associated with rising domestic financing of the budget. 
 
Generally the picture that one gathers from this discussion is one that is consistent with 
earlier studies on aid and fiscal policy in Ghana—that aid does not significantly affect 
government expenditures or revenue but rather affects government fiscals through 
domestic borrowing. In other words when government has experienced aid shortfalls, it 
finances the gap using domestic borrowing (Osei et al. 2005). However it needs also to 
be added that one cannot solely attribute trends in domestic borrowing to aid shortfalls. 
An example is when in 2006 domestic borrowing increased in spite of improvement in 
the reliability of on-budget aid.  
 
Figure 11: On-budget aid predictability and government expenditures 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from various Government of Ghana budgets.    17
Figure: 12: On-budget aid predictability versus domestic financing of deficits, 2002-09 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from various government of Ghana budgets. 
8  Does oil provide a way out for Ghana? 
8.1  A brief background on oil production in Ghana 
 
Ghana has recently found crude oil off the shores of its Western Atlantic Coast. Initial 
estimates of the Jubilee Field’s find put the reserves, as of October 2009, at about 490 
million barrels of high-quality oil. The price at which commercial exploitation is viable 
is US$30. Since late 2010, production has started and it is expected to span two decades. 
Production is expected to peak at about 120,000 barrels of oil a day over the 2011-16 
period. With the fiscal regime in place and an average world price of about 
US$75/barrel, it is estimated that government revenue will be about US$1 billion 
annually (Osei and Domfe 2008). 
 
The estimated average annual oil revenue that will accrue to Ghana is not trivial. 
However compared to other oil rich African countries, Ghana’s oil revenue remains 
small. In fact to put the revenue in better perspective we examine how much fiscal space 
the oil revenue creates for Ghana. As a proportion of projected tax revenue and fiscal 
deficits for 2010, the estimated oil revenue will be respectively 23 per cent and 72 per 
cent. Furthermore, compared to cocoa and gold exports, oil revenues will be no more 
than 51 per cent and 36 per cent respectively (Table 6). These indicators are emphatic in 
terms of the fiscal space provided by the oil revenue—even if the country were to use all 
the oil revenue today, it cannot meet all its fiscal challenges. This is not to suggest that 
the estimates of the oil revenue stream to Ghana is trivial. Rather it is to highlight the 
fact that there is limited (or no) scope for inefficient use of the oil revenue.  
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Table 6: Fiscal implications of the oil revenue to Ghana 
  2010 Fiscal estimate 
(US$ million) 
Oil revenue 
(% of 2010 fiscal indicator) 
Tax revenue  4,337.30  23.06 
Total exports  6,124.60  16.33 
Overall fiscal deficits  -1,389.30  -71.98 
Cocoa exports  1,978.20  50.55 
Gold exports  2,799.20  35.72 
GDP 18,524.30  5.40 
 
Source: Calculated from GoG Budget 2010 data and World Bank oil revenue estimate of US$1 
billion a year. 
 
The recent rebasing exercise places Ghana in the lower-middle-income category. The 
oil find and the direct growth dividend from oil revenue will cement this new status. 
However the country still faces the hard choices that all low-income countries confront 
as they seek to generate the conditions which promote and sustain growth and 
development over the long term. 
8.2  What are some of the likely consequences of oil production in Ghana? 
 
The literature is replete with examples of how oil resource (boom) particularly in Africa 
has been more of a curse than a blessing. However there is nothing that destines a 
country to the ‘path of doom’ with natural resources. Therefore, Ghana’s oil find will 
not on its own, automatically translate into adverse macroeconomic and social 
outcomes. However it is important for policy purposes that the potential or possible 
consequences are known so that policy can take cognizance of them. Some of the 
possible consequences of oil production are as follows:  
 
Dutch disease: A significant body of research over the last 20 years has shown that 
natural resource endowment of many developing countries adversely affected the 
efficiency with which they have used their capital and consequently, resulted in worse 
social and economic conditions—a phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’. Among 
the factors that have been used to explain the resource curse is ‘Dutch Disease’—where 
the increased revenue from the mineral resources exported has the effect of raising the 
price of domestic goods relative to foreign goods (see Auty 2001; Sachs and Warner 
1995; Osei and Domfe 2008).  
 
Fiscal indiscipline: An important fiscal implication of an oil boom to an economy is 
that it increases the government’s overall revenue. Unfortunately, this is sometimes 
accompanied by decreases in the revenue from the non-oil sectors mainly as a result of a 
fall in output and employment of the lagging sectors. As a result of the increases in 
revenue from the boom, Government’s incentive to spend may also increase and since 
expenditure is rigid downwards (particularly in developing countries), any adverse 
shock will result in fiscal imbalances. Revenue volatility induced by the oil boom can 
thus increase the country’s vulnerability. For instance it is estimated that if oil prices 
had been US$18 (1 standard deviation) lower in 2005, about half of the oil-producing 
countries would have recorded overall fiscal deficits (IMF 2007). 
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Capital flows: The capital intensive nature of oil production will mean that oil-
producing companies will raise and bring into the economy huge financial resources. 
Oil booms are therefore usually associated with increased capital inflows to the 
producing country. However, the inflows will mainly go to the oil tradable and non-
tradable sectors leaving the non-oil tradable sector. This may result in a shrinking of the 
manufacturing and the agricultural sectors. According to Barthel et al. (2011) a 
significant proportion of the unprecedented level of inflows  to Africa in 2007 went 
directly into the natural resource-based sectors. Coupled with this is the fact that aid 
flows are likely to be displaced in the medium to long term. The net effect of these 
resource shifts will depend on whether private capital will come to finance the 
previously aid-financed expenditures. 
 
Internal migration: Although Ghana’s oil production is off-shore, there is already 
significant activity around the south western part (Takoradi-Axim area) of the country 
which is closest to the oil wells. With the high inequality and unemployment situation in 
the country, there is no doubt that the prospects of jobs will attract migrants to this area. 
An obvious effect will be to increase the pressure on social amenities in this part of the 
country. A more serious problem though is that human resources will be lost to other 
sectors—the most probably being the agriculture sector. In the absence of a growing 
manufacturing and/or high productivity service sector this will pose a significant 
development challenge for the economy.  
9 Conclusions 
This study had a simple aim: to present an analysis of the aid-private capital flows-
growth nexus particularly in view of the fact that Ghana has now started production of 
oil, with all the potential resource curse pitfalls staring it in the face. Our main findings 
are summarized as follows.  
 
Generally both aid and private capital flows (including FDI) have increased over the 
years. These increases have been associated with increases in growth and human 
development in Ghana. Also the country has recorded quite remarkable decreases in the 
incidence of poverty. However inequality and underemployment remain and have 
worsened.  
 
We have also argued that the structure of the Ghanaian economy has changed over the 
years. Unfortunately the type of change that we have observed is not of the 
developmentally transformative type. Additionally oil production has started at a time 
when the country has attained a lower-middle-income status. This in all likelihood will 
mean a decrease in foreign aid in the medium to long term. So at best oil production 
may only replace foreign aid in the long term. However, in the short term when Ghana 
has the complement of aid and oil revenue, it needs to take advantage of the situation. It 
is therefore essential that aid is used in a creative way to help channel resources to the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors to help increase productivity. This is very 
important for at least two reasons. First, when aid is applied to modernize the 
agricultural sector, labour will become more productive and the sector will be properly 
positioned to produce more to feed the manufacturing sector. Second, a rejuvenated 
manufacturing sector will increase demand for agricultural goods, thereby solving the 
perennial problem of marketing agricultural products.  
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We conclude by making two suggestions about how aid can be used to help transform 
the economy. First, there is a strong case to be made in the use of aid to help solve the 
structural deficiency in government fiscals (see UNDP 2011). Here we would suggest 
that aid can be used both directly and/or indirectly (by influencing policy) towards 
resolving the perennial deficits which really constrains policy. For instance, arrears 
which have become a feature of the government’s budget in Ghana make planning very 
difficult as there is very little fiscal space for any meaningful programmes to be 
undertaken. This in turn compounds the fiscal and consequently macro stability 
problems in election years. Second, there is the need for aid to be based on a proper 
growth diagnostics. In fact the growth diagnostics can be undertaken for different 
sectors of the economy. In that way aid and other resources (including that from oil) can 
be better used to steer private investments towards well defined sectors within the 
economy. As noted by McMillan and Rodrik (2011), structural change is not an 
automatic process and therefore needs to be steered in the appropriate direction. A 
strategic use of aid can therefore help nudge the country in a direction that will help 
mitigate potential resource curse problems which confront it.  
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